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INTRODUCTION 
In the mid- and late 1980s—a time that could arguably be described as the 
golden age of feminist legal thought, for North America at any rate—empirical 
researchers as well as theorists were virtually obliged to take sides in the cross-
disciplinary debate (or dialogue of the deaf) concerning “postmodernism.”1 The 
intrafeminist fights often focused on the work of feminist philosopher Judith 
Butler. Butler’s analyses were not primarily focused on legal mechanisms,2 but the 
implications of postmodern theorizations of gender such as those developed by 
Butler for legal studies loomed large in the investigations of feminist legal thinkers, 
both those who were “in favour” (e.g., Drucilla Cornell, Janet Halley, Wendy 
Brown, Nicola Lacey, Carol Smart) and those who were “against,” who included 
not only mainstream liberals like Martha Nussbaum, but also socialist feminists 
such as Nancy Fraser and radical feminists such as Catharine MacKinnon. 
Regardless of the answers given, the question addressed by these heated debates—
 
* Director and Professor, Centre of Criminology and Sociolegal Studies, University of Toronto. 
1. FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990). 
2. While not a legal theorist as such, Butler has analyzed the regulation of sex and gender 
through law at various points in her work. More pertinent to this Article is the fact that Butler has 
also made a major contribution (which does not seem to have been much read by professional legal 
theorists) to thinking about the gendering of justice from a postessentialist perspective via a reflection 
on the way in which the figure of Antigone has been taken up in Western philosophy. See JUDITH 
BUTLER, ANTIGONE’S CLAIM: KINSHIP BETWEEN LIFE AND DEATH (2000). 
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is postmodern theory useful for feminism?—was based on a presupposition that 
was rarely, if ever, made explicit. This presupposition perhaps could only emerge 
as itself a question later on, in retrospect: namely, that theories, postmodern or 
otherwise, should be judged for their value for theorizing gendered subjectivity. 
In the second decade of the twenty-first century, there are remarkably few 
traces of the great wars about postmodernism versus humanism and about 
essentialist versus anti-essentialist views of gendered subjectivity within legal 
theory and in broader feminist theory circles. While the relative weakness of 
today’s feminism as compared to the more powerful and more hopeful movement 
of the 1980s has received a great deal of attention and commentary,3 the question 
this Article addresses is not the quantitative one of strength versus weakness, but 
rather the qualitative, indeed philosophical, question of the object of theory. That 
is, while understanding the changing political winds that may have brought about a 
weakening or a dispersal of the feminist impulse in the English-speaking world is 
important, such political commentaries have not shed much, if any, light on 
shifting assumptions regarding the fundamental question of the purpose, the 
driving force, and/or the telos of theoretical work, and theory’s basic form and 
logic. At this level, one can see, in retrospect, that the famous fights about 
postmodernism of the 1980s were fights about how to theorize subjectivity, and in 
the case of feminist theory, gendered subjectivity. If the great intrafeminist fights 
about postmodernism that took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s now seem 
quaint, this is because the focus of theoretical attention has shifted away from 
subjectivity—that which the postmodern debates sought to theorize. But why and 
how did subjectivity recede into the background for legal and social theory? In this 
Article I show that in feminist legal studies, as in other areas, a dual shift in 
theoretical scale is what explains the relative decline of debates about gendered 
subjectivity. 
The first component of this thus far unnoticed scale shift concerns what we 
could call the venue or the locale privileged by theory. Specifically, the everyday 
subjectivity or consciousness of ordinary metropolitan folk, which was the primary 
object of analysis for second-wave white feminism,4 does not now appear nearly 
as interesting as the far less individualized situation of people—women, for 
feminist theory—in locales that are far removed from the writer’s own and that 
are often perceived, or more often imagined, through an Orientalist or exoticist 
filter. The geographic and jurisdictional shift5 in theoretical interest that has taken 
 
3. See, e.g., Margaret Thornton, An Inconsistent Affair: Feminism and the Legal Academy, in 
TRANSCENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: GENERATIONS OF FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 25 
(Martha Albertson Fineman ed., 2011) [hereinafter TRANSCENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW]; 
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND THEORY 25–39 (Janice Richardson & Ralph Sandland eds., 
2000). 
4. FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM, supra note 1, at 1. 
5. See Mariana Valverde, Jurisdiction and Scale: Legal Technicalities as Resources for Theory, 18 SOC. & 
LEGAL STUD. 139, 140 (2009). 
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us away from the domestic realm—both in the sense of domestic national policies 
and in the sense of the ordinary household—and to the transnational has certainly 
brought about theoretical innovations and successes, and I hasten to note that I 
am not in any way advocating a return to the sometimes parochial and often 
ethnocentric paradigms of the 1970s and 1980s. However, the shift to the 
transnational has had the perhaps unintended effect of sidelining or even burying 
certain critiques (the feminist critique of “ordinary” marriage, for example) that 
still have validity today, but that are rarely taken up as serious questions for 
feminist theory. 
The second component of the scale shift with which this Article is 
concerned is that theoretical fashions today encourage us (and I include myself in 
this critique) to focus not on people and their consciousness and self-
consciousness, but rather on flows, networks, governance assemblages, and so 
forth. This scale shift, again, has many virtues; but it may have brought about a 
neglect not only of particular theories of gendered subjectivity popular in the 
1980s, but even of subjectivity itself. Combined with a shift to “global” locations 
and venues historically regarded by Westerners as giving rise to undifferentiated 
victimhood rather than self-aware subjectivity, a loss of theoretical attention to 
subjectivity may be problematic. 
Before analyzing this dual scale shift in some detail, it is useful to ask the 
genealogical question, namely, how did subjectivity come to occupy, often 
implicitly and without discussion, such a central location for theory in the 1980s? 
Very briefly, the questions about subjectivity, subject positions, consciousness, and 
the like, which were central for the 1980s, were inherited from the structuralist 
theorizing of the 1950s and 1960s, as opposed to carefully chosen.6 But the 
question of the subject then gained a new and eventful life through the varied 
poststructuralist investigations of contradictory and fragmented subjectivity, and 
of course, also through the denunciations of postmodernism that followed, 
denunciations that often claimed that postmodern theorizations were disrespectful 
of or inimical to the politically conscious subjectivity that critical theorists all 
sought to promote. 
Whatever the answer, however, it seemed clear that the question of the 
subject was the question for theory in the 1980s and early 1990s. For example, 
Judith Butler’s most famous work, Gender Trouble, was devoted to showing that the 
humanist assumptions conceiving subjectivity as static and inborn were wrong, 
 
6. The large debt that poststructuralism owed to classic structuralist analyses was often 
minimized or left unmentioned. One notable essay that did make this debt explicit was Gayle Rubin’s 
The Traffic in Women, which used a detailed commentary on Levi-Strauss’s theory of kin relations to 
build something like the germ of queer theory. Gayle Rubin, The Traffic in Women: Notes on the “Political 
Economy” of Sex, in TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF WOMEN 157, 157–210 (Rayna R. Reiter ed., 
1975). But in general, feminist and left-wing writers of the 1980s minimized their debt to the 
structuralist paradigms that shaped not only anthropology, but also cultural studies and social theory, 
generally in the 1960s and 1970s. 
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and that the modern self-aware subject with a complex interiority, a self-
consciousness, is actually the product of juridical and disciplinary governance 
processes, with gender being one of the key vectors for subject formation.7 Few 
noticed at the time that Butler began her argument by presupposing that 
subjectivity is that which needs to be theorized: “The question of ‘the subject’ is 
crucial for politics, and for feminist politics in particular, because juridical subjects 
are invariably produced through certain exclusionary practices . . . .”8 Significantly, 
Part One of this book is entitled “Subjects of Sex/Gender/Desire.”9 For all the 
attention, positive and negative, that Butler’s theory of gendered subjectivity drew, 
little was said about the original, shared question to which Butler gave a 
particularly innovative answer. 
A similar concern with finding more sophisticated, less conventional tools 
for theorizing subjectivity, and gendered subjectivity in particular, undergirded 
Drucilla Cornell’s important explorations of what Lacanian psychoanalysis and 
deconstruction might do for feminist legal thought. Her book Transformations 
begins by declaring that the task of critical sociolegal theory is to analyze the 
transformation of “the subject” in work in which the “subject” or topic is itself 
“transformation.”10 If Cornell, along with other (mainly European) feminist 
thinkers, spent time reading and reflecting on Jacques Lacan’s work, this was 
because Lacan was then regarded as the most important theorist of psychic 
formation, that is, of individual subjectivity, just as neo-Marxist writers such as 
Ernesto Laclau and Stuart Hall were regarded as providing better answers than 
orthodox Marxism to the questions of class and, more generally, group 
subjectivity or consciousness. 
The answers to the question of “what is subjectivity?” clearly varied. Socialist 
humanists as well as feminist humanists defended the “agency” of subaltern 
subjects (in keeping with the now-neglected but then tremendously influential 
work of E.P. Thompson, which had a huge impact on the nascent enterprise of 
 
7. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 3–9 
(1990). 
8. Id. at 5. 
9. Id. at 3. This section of Butler’s book draws on Foucault’s work, but also on Butler’s earlier, 
magisterial work on French appropriations of Hegel’s theory of self-consciousness, which had been 
her doctoral dissertation and appeared later as a book, significantly entitled Subjects of Desire. JUDITH 
BUTLER, SUBJECTS OF DESIRE (1987). Butler’s interest in French twentieth-century theories of the 
subject was by no means idiosyncratic. For reasons that would require another article to explain, 
France—and Paris in particular—was widely regarded as the privileged source of theories applicable 
to the world at large during the second half of the twentieth century, from Sartre in the 1950s through 
Althusser and Lacan in the 1960s and 1970s to Derrida and Foucault in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Therefore, if “the subject,” subjectivity, and subject positions were in vogue in Paris, there was a good 
chance these entities would also come to be regarded as the default objects for critical social theory 
everywhere else. 
10. DRUCILLA CORNELL, TRANSFORMATIONS: RECOLLECTIVE IMAGINATION AND SEXUAL 
DIFFERENCE 1 (1993). 
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feminist history as well as in some social science networks).11 On their part, hard-
core structuralist Marxists, a shrinking but still influential group, ridiculed the 
agency of subaltern subjects as a liberal humanist delusion. Feminists influenced 
by Lacan, in turn, explored the nonidentity of the subject (e.g., in the English 
journal m/f, and later in some contributions to Law and Critique). In the meantime, 
feminist thinkers influenced by deconstruction and other tools for revealing the 
contradictions of fragmented subjectivities proceeded to show how the opposition 
between “feminine” and “masculine” deconstructed itself,12 with Gayatri Spivak 
being arguably the leader in this regard and Drucilla Cornell making the most 
sustained effort to use insights from Lacan as well as deconstruction in legal 
contexts.13 
The problem of how to theorize gendered and sexed subjectivity gave much 
food for thought for feminist legal theory as for all progressive thought in debates 
that attracted large and not exclusively academic audiences both in print and in 
real life.14 Thus, if we now want to ask whatever happened to feminist legal 
theory, and we are interested in philosophical shifts rather than political winds of 
change, the question can be reworded, more concretely, as the question of 
whatever happened to theorizing (gendered) subjectivity. 
This Article attempts to provide a genealogical account of the 
epistemological assumptions of today’s feminist legal thought focusing not on the 
rise of neoliberalism or globalization or any of the other keywords popular today, 
but rather on the obverse process: the quiet sidelining of subjectivity as the central 
issue for critical theory, including feminist legal studies. And to explain how “the 
subject” of critical theory was displaced or quietly moved to the back burner—in a 
move that put an end to the endless postmodern debates without any winners 
having been declared, or any closure having been reached—the theoretical 
metaphor I use, as already mentioned, is that of “scale shift.” I argue that just as 
the 1980s focus on gendered subjectivity was not an autonomous product of 
feminist reflection, but was rather rooted in and reflective of larger theoretical 
currents, so too, the project of theorizing gendered subjectivity fell victim to a 
dual theoretical scale shift also affecting other fields of critical thought. 
Like all scale shifts, the processes described here brought certain phenomena 
 
11. See, e.g., EDWARD PALMER THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING 
CLASS (1963). 
12. See, e.g., Mary Poovey, Feminism and Deconstruction, 14 FEMINIST STUD. 51, 57 (1988) 
(“[A]sking women to read as ‘woman’ . . . is to make a self-contradictory request, for it appeals to the 
condition of being a woman as if it were a given and simultaneously urges that this condition be 
created or achieved.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
13. DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE IMAGINARY DOMAIN: ABORTION, PORNOGRAPHY AND 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT (1995); CORNELL, supra note 10, at 5 (describing her attempt to “dismantle 
the rigid structures of gender identity” while simultaneously upholding the “affirmation of feminine 
sexual difference”). 
14. Cf. Mariana Valverde, Beyond Gender Dangers and Private Pleasures: Theory and Ethics in the Sex 
Debates, 15 FEMINIST STUD. 237 (1989). 
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into focus that had previously been blurred or pushed to the background; but by 
the same token, other forms of power and other sites of masculine privilege 
became increasingly invisible. And at the level of feminist politics of law reform, 
the most glaring absence in the new paradigm is that of the critique of the 
institution of marriage and of contractual models of family and intimate relations, 
a critique generated by theorists focusing on the “everyday” subjectivity of 
ordinary heterosexual Western women, the theoretical object shared by socialist 
and radical feminists of the 1970s and 1980s (and to some extent also by liberal 
feminists). 
The following section describes, in general terms, the dual scale shift that 
made contemporary theory possible. Part II will briefly consider some key works 
of the 1980s, works that are still heavily cited today but which have been very 
selectively appropriated so as to bury some aspects of their radical critique of the 
subjectivity or legal consciousness of ordinary everyday Western married 
women—aspects that could perhaps be usefully revived. This Article then 
concludes, in a necessarily speculative manner, with the consequences and 
implications of the scale shifts described here for critical legal thought and practice 
today. 
I. FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY RESCALED: GEOGRAPHY, CULTURAL DIFFERENCE, 
AND THE INVISIBILIZATION OF “ORDINARY” FEMININE SUBJECTIVITY 
Around 1980, most critical work in legal and political analysis available in 
English was concerned with what was then called the “consciousness” of ordinary 
everyday people living in the metropole. Marxist theorists focused on working-
class consciousness, using Gramsci and Marxist cultural studies to ponder whether 
consumer culture had fatally tainted the class consciousness of the working class 
in affluent countries. Feminist thought concerned itself with political 
representation, with abortion rights, and with access to nontraditional jobs (blue-
collar and professional), but it also spent much time and energy addressing the 
dynamics of ordinary married heterosexual life. Ms. magazine, for example, 
promoted the American bootstrap theory of social change by urging women to 
become professionals and managers, but the magazine also critiqued the dynamics 
of everyday domesticity—“the personal is the political” was a slogan that was not 
confined to the more radical sectors of the women’s movement. 
In U.S. law and society circles—which, like other American intellectual 
networks, generally remained either hostile to or simply untouched by the hard-
line Marxist structuralism popular in Western Europe and other places with a 
strong Marxist tradition (e.g., Latin America, India)—the focus on the 
consciousness of ordinary folk gave rise to such innovations as the idea of “legal 
consciousness,” almost always studied, in the early days of that literature, by 
examining the actions, thoughts, and aspirations of working-class Americans. Sally 
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Merry’s influential Getting Justice and Getting Even is one of several important works 
in this line,15 and it was heavily cited in later work that focused more directly and 
explicitly on the gendered subjectivity of ordinary Americans. She and others 
within the law and society movement focused on working-class and poor people’s 
struggles with law, as distinct from mainstream liberal feminists’ focus on cross-
class gender issues or issues specific to middle-class and professional women; but 
alongside these political differences there was a common theoretical focus: the 
subjectivity (or consciousness) of ordinary, mainly white, mainly married folks 
living in the metropole.16 
The consciousness/subjectivity of ordinary Western folks was also the focus 
of the nascent radical feminist theorization of patriarchy developed by many 
activists and writers, amongst whom only Catharine MacKinnon is now 
remembered.17 MacKinnon and her more populist friend and colleague Andrea 
Dworkin sometimes used particularly violent instances of patriarchal domination 
for emotional effect, but their analysis was radical precisely because they insisted 
that patriarchal power was present everywhere, even in ordinary happy marriages, 
and was even constitutive of gender, and thus of female subjectivity, as such.18 It 
is significant, in retrospect, that even when finding and publicizing extreme 
examples of masculine domination, their favorite examples came from the 
California pornography industry, not from exotic Third World locales.19 
In contrast to the default locales of 1980s feminist thought, namely the 
ordinary households and workplaces of the metropole, and in contrast to that 
thought’s theoretical focus on ordinary Americans, feminist thought and analysis 
today—within legal studies, but also in other disciplines—tends to focus either on 
“exotic” locales (Asian brothels, African refugee camps) or on transnational and 
diasporic populations in the West. Feminist work on migration, on the 
 
15. SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LOCAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS (1990). 
16. See, e.g., Hendrik Hartog, Abigail Bailey’s Coverture: Law in a Married Woman’s Consciousness, in 
LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE 63, 63–108 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1993). 
17. Mary O’Brien authored another innovative work that also turned Marxist paradigms of 
labor and surplus value on its head, but focused on reproduction and childbirth rather than on sexual 
activity. MARY O’BRIEN, THE POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION (1981). O’Brien had been a midwife in 
Scotland for many years before she arrived in Toronto to earn a doctorate in social theory, writing a 
dissertation that used Hegelian and Marxist language to theorize women’s oppression as rooted in 
men’s appropriation of women’s reproductive labor. Despite its high intellectual quality, her work had 
only short-term and local influence, perhaps because she never sought media attention or travelled 
widely to give talks, unlike Dworkin and MacKinnon. Susan Griffin and Mary Daly were two other 
noted radical feminist philosophers of the time who are now forgotten. SUSAN GRIFFIN, WOMAN 
AND NATURE (1978); Daly’s work will be briefly discussed below. See infra note 27 and accompanying 
text. 
18. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND 
LAW 9, 24, 128 (1987). 
19. ANDREA DWORKIN, OUR BLOOD: PROPHECIES AND DISCOURSES ON SEXUAL 
POLITICS 101–11 (1976); MACKINNON, supra note 18, at 128; CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, 
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 195–214 (1989). 
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international division of labor, on diasporic communities in the West, and on 
exploited “Third World” women has come to displace the old socialist-feminist 
interest in working-class Western women, as well as the old liberal-feminist focus 
on professional or would-be professional Western women. Significantly, Sally 
Merry’s recent work has been almost exclusively concerned with international 
human/gender rights and has focused attention on parts of the world that had 
been virtually ignored by the pioneers of second-wave feminist legal analysis.20 
Liberal legal feminism is a diffuse mainstream movement, which makes its 
history difficult to pin down or analyze; but the tremendous popularity, today, of 
human rights and philanthropic campaigns focused on racialized women and girls 
in Asia and Africa (e.g., the corporate “Because I’m a girl” campaign21 to provide 
private development aid specifically for girls’ projects) suggests that even though 
liberal feminists have by no means stopped worrying about gender differences in 
salary in the metropole, abortion access, and other traditional liberal feminist 
campaigns, the shift to the transnational is visible in liberal feminism too. That 
liberal, pink-ribbon quasi feminism tends to exoticize girls and women in foreign 
locations and to demonize “brown men”22 in its portrayal of the gender politics at 
work in such locales has already been pointed out by numerous feminist writers.23 
But what is less obvious is that, despite the marked political differences separating 
liberal feminists from both the progressive feminism of people like Sally Merry 
and the radical feminism of MacKinnon and her followers, a similar quasi-
geographical scale shift can be observed in liberal feminist concerns about law and 
state power. (I say “quasi-geographical” to draw attention to the connotations of 
locales such as the sex industry of Thailand or war-torn villages in Africa, locales 
that come already infused with certain Orientalist meanings that are not a 
necessary product of geographical difference.) The shift may have been more 
opportunity-driven than theory-driven, insofar as during the 1990s the possibilities 
for feminist legal change were rather dim in the United States while international 
law provided some points of entry, such as the development of the “rape as a war 
crime” campaign24—points of entry into the transnational opened up by radical 
feminists, but later exploited by feminist lawyers and activists working closely with 
 
20. See, e.g., SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: 
TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE (2006). 
21. See BECAUSE I AM A GIRL, https://becauseiamagirl.ca (last visited Jan. 29, 2013). 
22. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in MARXISM AND THE 
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 271, 297 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds., 1988). 
23. E.g., Ratna Kapur, ‘Faith’ and the ‘Good’ Liberal: The Construction of Female Sexual Subjectivity in 
Anti-Trafficking Legal Discourse, in SEXUALITY AND THE LAW: FEMINIST ENGAGEMENTS 223, 227–
232 (Vanessa E. Munro & Carl F. Stychin eds., 2007); PRABHA KOTISWARAN, DANGEROUS SEX, 
INVISIBLE LABOR: SEX WORK AND THE LAW IN INDIA (2011). 
24. See, e.g., Jina Moore, Confronting Rape as a War Crime: Will a New U.N. Campaign Have Any 
Impact?, 4 CQ GLOBAL RESEARCHER 105 (2010). 
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Hillary Clinton’s State Department.25 But whatever the immediate reasons for the 
scale shift, the fact remains that what Betty Friedan had diagnosed as “the 
problem with no name” in the very early stages of second-wave American 
feminism,26 that is, the gendered troubles of ordinary white American women, 
completely receded from view. 
In regard to radical feminism, some of the key theoretical works of the 1970s 
and 1980s were written at the scale of grand philosophy, the now-unknown work 
of feminist theologian Mary Daly27 being perhaps the best known in North 
America. In continental Europe, where university-educated women were likely to 
have read Kant, Hegel, and Lacan, and were very unlikely to be interested in 
theological paradigms, feminist or otherwise, Luce Irigaray and Helene Cixous 
pioneered a certain brand of radical feminist philosophy that sought to celebrate 
not so much women’s biology as women’s desire.28 And in many Western 
countries, analyses of the inherently rapacious character of masculinity as such 
converged to some degree with the environmental radicalism that was then 
emerging, with the gendering of the Earth as a vulnerable female figure being key 
in this intellectual merger; but for present purposes the fate of this type of thought 
need not concern us, since it had little, if any, interest in legal reform or legal 
analysis. The more relevant currents for our purposes were those that swirled 
around Catharine MacKinnon, whose first book, important because it invented 
the term “sexual harassment,” shared many of the initial questions also posed by 
Sally Merry’s work on ordinary working-class Americans, even though their 
answers were markedly different.29 
At the level of politics and practical legal change, Andrea Dworkin and 
Catharine MacKinnon’s most important campaign of the 1980s concerned 
pornography. As is well known, the innovative strategy they pursued was to break 
with the legal habit of governing pornography by means of the criminal law of 
obscenity and turn instead to civil law remedies.30 The theoretical drive for this 
ultimately unsuccessful strategy was that they wanted to stress that pornography 
harmed women directly, women as a group (not just the women working in the 
industry or the women whose male partners were unduly influenced by its images), 
 
25. See Janet Halley et al., From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, 
Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. 
& GENDER 335, 356–58 (2006). 
26. BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 15 (1963). 
27. MARY DALY, GYN/ECOLOGY: THE METAETHICS OF RADICAL FEMINISM (1990). 
28. See, e.g., LUCE IRIGARAY, THIS SEX WHICH IS NOT ONE 23–33 (Catherine Porter & 
Carolyn Burke trans., Cornell Univ. Press 1985) (1977); Hélène Cixous, The Laugh of the Medusa, 1 
SIGNS 875, 876 (Keith Cohen & Paula Cohen trans., 1976). 
29. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE 
OF SEX DISCRIMINATION, at xii (1979) (describing her project as “bring[ing] to the law something of 
the reality of women’s lives,” and arguing for the recognition of the phenomenon of sexual 
harassment). 
30. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 1, 20–70 (1985). 
           
334 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  4:325 
and that this harm was essentially a civil group harm—rather than an offense 
against public morals that should be legally regulated as a crime against the state.31 
Whatever its legal and political defects—analyzed and debated by numerous 
critics and supporters, both feminist and nonfeminist, at the time—the campaign 
to redefine pornography as a civil-law harm to women as a group had the 
theoretical virtue of strongly unifying the ordinary women of metropolitan 
countries, regardless of race, class, age, marital status, or any other demographic 
variable. This unification of women, considered as collective victims of an 
industry based on the commodification and objectification of the female body, 
was a theoretical move that drew heavily on the structuralist theory of working-
class subjectivity that had been promoted by Louis Althusser and his many 
followers in previous decades. Althusser is only quoted once in Toward a Feminist 
Theory of the State,32 but it may be significant that the book cited there, For Marx, 
carried out a systematic critique not only of Hegelian and humanist interpretations 
of Marxism, but, much more radically, of any effort to create a historically 
grounded socialist theory of social change.33 
The Althusserian influence on MacKinnon’s approach to theorizing 
gendered subjectivity may not have come directly. At that time, any attempt to 
theorize “the” state—as we used to say—necessarily engaged with the 
Althusserian paradigm of subjectivity as wholly constituted through the operation 
of “state ideological apparatuses,” and much of the debate about what we always 
called “the” state in fact consisted of nothing but minor modifications of the 
Althusserian model. It made sense that just as Althusserians proclaimed that all 
workers in capitalist economies are structurally oppressed,34 no matter how 
contented they might be, so too MacKinnon, who more than any other feminist 
legal analyst put herself forward as a grand theorist on a par with Althusser, would 
proceed to argue that what individual women say or think about either 
pornography or about their experience with individual men is irrelevant when 
theorizing pornography, and gender in general.35 Applying Althusser’s paradigm to 
 
31. MACKINNON, supra note 18, at 162. 
32. MACKINNON, supra note 19, at 108. 
33. See LOUIS ALTHUSSER, FOR MARX (Verso 2005) (1969). 
34. LOUIS ALTHUSSER, LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 132–33 (Ben 
Brewster trans., 1971). 
35. In a remarkable passage buried in a footnote, MacKinnon went so far in the direction of 
denying individual—and collective—agency as to claim that it is easier to change nature than social 
relations: “The intractability of maleness as a form of dominance suggests that social constructs, 
although they flow from human agency, can be less plastic than nature has proven to be.” Catharine 
MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 636 n.3 
(1983). Equally surprisingly, MacKinnon told women that discovering and exploring their attraction 
to other women does not represent freedom, since sex is by definition the oppression of one group 
by another: “[W]omen sexually choosing women can challenge the position of women as the sexually 
acted-upon. . . . But so long as gender is a system of power . . . it can merely extend this choice to 
those women who can get the power to enforce it.” MACKINNON, supra note 18, at 14. Her portrayal 
of lesbianism—which in the late 1980s, was a much more difficult and braver choice than it is 
           
2014] RESCALING OF FEMINIST ANALYSES 335 
gender, MacKinnon argued that gender is not just shaped, but also actually 
constituted by the ideological apparatuses of patriarchal power, not by the 
thoughts or deeds of actual women.36 And just as Althusser and structuralist 
Marxists generally thought that one had to identify an overriding factor, a single 
process that “in the last instance” took precedence over other factors—the 
relations of production—so too MacKinnon clearly believed that if she was going 
to offer feminists a general theory on the same epistemological plane as the most 
rigorous Marxist theories then prevalent, historical and cultural diversity in 
women’s experiences had to be minimized in favor of what Althusser famously 
called “determination in the last instance”—which for her was the sexual 
relationship. While gay and lesbian writers were at this time emphasizing sexual 
diversity, MacKinnon, intent on building a grand, rigorous, and therefore (given 
the standards of the time) structural theory, went in the opposite direction, 
stressing that underneath the apparent diversity of sexual experiences one can 
identify a constant, basic structure that is inherently oppressive and that 
constitutes all subjectivity as gendered subjectivity.37 
MacKinnon’s key choice of pornography as a political target for her early 
work can also be said to have an Althusserian influence or at least an Althusserian 
flavor, given his well-known insistence—as against more conventionally 
materialist, labor-oriented Marxists—that material oppression is not only 
facilitated but actually produced through ideological forces that take the form of 
words. Words are not mere words; when inscribed in and generated by ideological 
systems, words have material effects, Althusser famously argued, because without 
those words and beliefs the material forces would be revealed for what they are 
and start to crumble. As Althusser wrote in his most influential essay, Ideology and 
Ideological State Apparatuses: 
[T]he reproduction of labour power requires not only a reproduction of 
its skills, but also, at the same time, a reproduction of its submission to 
the rules of the established order, i.e. a reproduction of submission to the 
ruling ideology for the workers, and a reproduction of the ability to 
manipulate the ruling ideology correctly for the agents of exploitation and 
repression, so that they, too, will provide for the domination of the ruling 
class ‘in words’.38 
Replacing “workers” with “women” in this passage results in a very good 
paraphrase of MacKinnon’s analysis of the importance of recognizing 
pornography as an attack on women, rather than further empowering the 
patriarchal state by supporting criminal sanctions. The ill-fated pursuit of a civil 
 
today—as an opportunity for some women to sexually exploit other women, underscored 
MacKinnon’s radical structuralism. 
36. MACKINNON, supra note 18, at 14. 
37. MACKINNON, supra note 19, at 116. 
38. ALTHUSSER, supra note 34, at 132–33. 
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remedy for the harms caused by pornography was rooted in the belief that 
pornography is a key ideological apparatus of the (patriarchal) state. 
Now, for legal purposes, whether in the antipornography campaign or in 
other contexts, MacKinnon and those radical feminist writers (e.g., Kathleen 
Berry, Sheila Jeffreys) who emphasized sex over other dimensions of life did not 
have to claim that sexual objectification is the basis of all gender oppression. 
Althusserians were not, after all, forced to privilege any one of the numerous 
ideological state apparatuses in their analyses (the church, the bourgeois family, 
the mass media, etc.). At the purely theoretical level, it was sufficient for radical 
feminist purposes to prove that there is collective harm, say in pornography, and 
that the harm should have a legal remedy (which of course was nearly impossible 
in the United States, given the constitutional obstacles to “hate speech” provisions 
that exist in other jurisdictions). But the analogy between surplus value and 
women’s structural oppression through the sexual objectification produced and 
reproduced in pornographic imagery was made stronger than it had to be for legal 
purposes. MacKinnon took gender structuralism to the extreme and claimed that 
sexual objectification is not just one amongst many patriarchal evils—as liberal 
and socialist feminists generally believed—but is in fact the foundation of 
patriarchy as such, lying at the root of all the other oppressions suffered by all 
women, regardless of economic class, geography, or culture.39 
It was clear that the greatest Marxist theorist of the 1970s, Althusser, rose to 
fame by minimizing the concrete differences amongst workers revealed by 
historians and social scientists, instead relentlessly insisting on rigorous structural 
analysis of the “underlying” relations of power that supposedly remain constant. It 
was thus equally clear that anyone wanting to write a feminist version of For Marx 
and the famous ideological apparatus essay was going to have to eschew 
multifactorial and historically specific analysis in favor of a single “determination 
in the last instance.” 
The intellectual debt to Marxism was openly acknowledged by MacKinnon; 
but what she never acknowledged was the specifically Althusserian framework that 
she borrowed. Given that she is a U.S.-trained lawyer, it may be that she happened 
to know Althusser’s work but never appreciated the rich heterogeneity of Marxist 
thought, which was much more apparent outside of the United States. 
Internationally, Marxist thought was a rich intellectual environment which (in the 
1970s) featured Gramscians; the then-eminent but now forgotten Trotskyist 
theorist Ernest Mandel; other, competing Trotskyist groups; an assortment of 
Maoists; and, of course, a range of socialist feminist thinkers. But whether the 
Althusserian framework was consciously chosen out of a set of alternatives, or 
whether it simply appeared for whatever reason as the top-rated, highest-ranked 
Marxist theory, and thus as the model worth following, the fact is that 
 
39. MACKINNON, supra note 19, at 124, 130. 
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MacKinnon’s theoretical paradigm for subjectivity out-Althussered Althusser in 
wholly dispensing with history. 
While even the most unhistorical structuralist Marxist would see capitalism 
as having a finite history, since the story of the birth and death of capitalism is the 
story that all versions of Marxism tell, in different ways, MacKinnon does not 
provide any discussion, however tentative, of either a prepatriarchal past or a 
postpatriarchal future. Her frame therefore lacks any feminist equivalent of what 
Marxists used to call the motor forces of history. Therefore, the subjectivity that is 
theorized in MacKinnon’s work of the 1980s is even more structured, so to speak, 
and less “agentic,” than that of the hardest of hard-line structuralist Marxists. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, feminists of all stripes routinely incorporated a 
historical dimension into their analyses by differentiating gender, regarded as 
historically specific and cultural, from natural “sex.” However problematic the 
binary distinction between nature and culture would prove to be, as later feminist 
theorists influenced by science and technology studies and actor-network theory 
convincingly showed, the taken-for-granted contrast between sex and gender 
helped to emphasize the variability and therefore changeability of many 
conventional gendered habits. MacKinnon sometimes spoke as if her analysis of 
the sexual relationship applied only to the present and perhaps only to advanced 
capitalist economies; nevertheless, the marked absence of any mention of 
alternatives—whether drawn from anthropological studies of matriarchal societies, 
from utopian feminist literature, from philosophical speculation of the Mary Daly 
type, or from any other of the available sources—had the effect of making her 
analysis seem universal and transhistorical. In a typical passage, she writes: “In the 
society we currently live in, the content I want to claim for sexuality is the gaze 
that constructs women as objects for male pleasure.”40 The phrase “[i]n the 
society we currently live in” suggests historical specificity; but in the absence of 
any consideration of “motor forces of history” that might possibly give sexuality a 
different content in the future, the gesturing toward historicity remains an empty 
gesture, as the reader is left with a hyperstructuralist picture of relentless and static 
domination. 
Sidelining history, without going so far against the (socialist) current as to 
explicitly declare history to be dead, was arguably the key epistemological move 
characterizing not only Althusser but also the structuralist tradition generally. This 
covert antihistorical move was the key precondition of the kind of grand 
theorizing that gave rise to such now-forgotten moments of intellectual 
excitement as the Poulantzas-Miliband debate41 (featuring Ralph Miliband, father 
of the current British Labour leader). Adopting this basic theoretical stance, the 
 
40. MACKINNON, supra note 18, at 53. 
41. PARADIGM LOST: STATE THEORY RECONSIDERED 3–5 (Stanley Aronowitz & Peter 
Bratsis eds., 2002). 
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essay that made MacKinnon famous in theory circles, Feminism, Marxism, Method, 
and the State: An Agenda for Feminist Theory, begins as follows: 
Sexuality is to feminism what work is to marxism: that which is most 
one’s own, yet most taken away. Marxist theory argues that society is 
fundamentally constructed of the relations people form as they do and 
make things needed to survive humanly. Work is the social process of 
shaping and transforming the material and social worlds, creating people 
as social beings as they create value. It is that activity by which people 
become who they are. Class is its structure, production its consequence, 
capital its congealed form, and control its issue. 
  Implicit in feminist theory is a parallel argument: the molding, 
direction, and expression of sexuality organizes society into two sexes—
women and men—which division underlies the totality of social relations. 
Sexuality is that social process which creates, organizes, expresses, and 
directs desire, creating the social beings we know as women and men, as 
their relations create society. As work is to marxism, sexuality to 
feminism is socially constructed yet constructing, universal as activity yet 
historically specific . . . . As the organized expropriation of the work of 
some for the benefit of others defines a class—workers—the organized 
expropriation of the sexuality of some for the use of others defines the 
sex, woman.42 
The use of the phrase “historically specific” is misleading, as pointed out 
above, since nowhere in her work does MacKinnon ever contemplate a feminist 
equivalent of the transitions from feudalism to capitalism and from capitalism to 
socialism that make up Marxism’s practices of temporalization. In the early essay 
just cited, MacKinnon points to the then-popular practice of small-group, face-to-
face consciousness raising as a source of potentially revolutionary knowledge,43 
but in later works this glimpse of the possibility of substantial social change 
recedes well into the background. “Female power,” MacKinnon famously replied 
to a question, in an answer later published in a major book, “is a contradiction in 
terms.”44 
Similarly, while it was customary then to point to “lesbian existence”45 as a 
quasi-utopian social experiment that few women would personally pursue but that 
systematically undermines masculine privilege and the heterosexual presumption 
that oppresses all women, MacKinnon refused to give lesbians (much less gay 
men) any special status, treating them as only slightly modified versions of the 
“male” and “female” subjects constructed in her theory. Her most important 
 
42. Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, in 
THE SIGNS READER: WOMEN, GENDER & SCHOLARSHIP 227, 227–28 (Elizabeth Abel & Emily K. 
Abel eds., 1983) [hereinafter THE SIGNS READER]. 
43. Id. at 231–32. 
44. MACKINNON, supra note 18, at 53. 
45. See, e.g., Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in THE SIGNS 
READER, supra note 42, at 139. 
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work, Feminism Unmodified, has four entries for “lesbian” in the index (and none for 
gay men); but it is significant that all four of these mentions concern men’s myths 
about or representations of lesbians.46 And the only mention of homosexuality 
(according to the index) is hardly flattering: homosexuality “may be no less 
gendered” than heterosexuality, the reader is told.47 This pessimistic reading of 
nonheterosexual relationships is very much in keeping with the hard-line Marxist 
structuralist contempt for such alternative forms of economic life as cooperatives. 
The picture of gender oppression that emerges from MacKinnon’s analyses 
is therefore one of historical stasis and geographic homogeneity—one that 
produces the most solidly unified “female/feminine subject” imaginable, through 
an analysis that, however reductive, is certainly much more rigorous than 
competing feminist theories of the time. While cast in universal terms, however, 
the oppressed female subject of MacKinnon’s early work has a distinct location: 
she is American, she is white, and she is found not only in pornography film 
studios, but also, and most important theoretically, in ordinary American family 
homes. This skewing of a supposedly geographically and culturally neutral subject 
position is not caused by a defect in MacKinnon’s rigor, but rather by the inherent 
contradictions of the Western project to theorize human subjectivity as such; as 
we have repeatedly seen, the logic of feminist legal theory is not at all limited to 
feminist legal subject matters. 
While much critical attention has been devoted over the years, in legal as well 
as other publications, to the sexual and gender reductionism of MacKinnon’s 
approach, the scale of MacKinnon’s early work has not to my knowledge been 
critically analyzed. And while at one level—that of womanhood in general—its 
scale was universal, the constantly repeated claim that even women who do not 
feel oppressed or are not being abused by men are just as oppressed, structurally, 
as their more obviously unhappy sisters had the effect of focusing the critical 
feminist legal gaze on the situation of ordinary American women. They were the 
intended beneficiaries of the ill-fated pornography ordinance, and were the actual 
beneficiaries of the numerous laws and policies naming and governing sexual 
harassment that emerged in the wake of the analyses produced by MacKinnon and 
others of the failings of domestic laws. 
However, the eventual success of the campaign to name the new wrong of 
sexual harassment did not create a benefit, in intellectual capital terms, for its 
inventor, since over the past decades sexual harassment has been constructed and 
governed through largely liberal mechanisms: the same civil-rights, formal equality 
mechanisms that also govern racist behavior in the workplace. The campaign met 
with success precisely because it could be repurposed by a liberal legal 
establishment concerned with eliminating disturbances in the workplace that were 
no longer in keeping with the increasing diversity of the global capitalist 
 
46. MACKINNON, supra note 18, at 15, 86, 122, 199, 311. 
47. Id. at 60. 
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workplace. Therefore, sexual harassment is regarded and governed as an unusual 
abuse of power—not as the normal everyday product of the gender/sex system. 
But in its early form, the critique of sexual harassment problematized what was 
then “ordinary” workplace behavior by ordinary guys48—a far cry from today’s 
focus on evil, alien sex traffickers from Asia and Eastern Europe. 
A sharp contrast exists between the way in which the sexual harassment of 
ordinary American women is constructed, in popular culture as well as in law, and 
the way in which the sexual oppression of women in exotic far-off locales is 
imagined. This contrast is at the root of the success of American radical feminism 
in the sphere of international gender/human rights. The scale shift to the 
Orient—if one can call it that without reproducing the very binaries I am calling 
into question—that took place as MacKinnon and many of her feminist lawyer 
friends shifted their attention away from domestic law and to the international has 
been amply criticized by postcolonial critics. Ever since Gayatri Spivak eloquently 
denounced white middle-class women’s long-standing project to flex their own 
political muscles and legal subjectivity by trying to free “brown women from 
brown men,” postcolonial critics have shown that existing Western missionary 
narratives are a crucial “switchpoint” enabling white Western feminists to 
construct themselves as the (legal) saviors of women in locales regarded as eternal 
sites of victimization.49 The scale shift described here has also been criticized for 
its tendency to tie feminist legal victories to campaigns that privilege coercive law 
and coercive mechanisms and thus often rely on unsavory law-and-order and/or 
racist allies.50 Both of these criticisms are very well taken; but what these critiques 
have not included within their purview is an analysis of the previous stage—that 
is, the relative failure of the hard-structuralist radical feminist theory of female 
subjectivity to prosper in the venue in which it was invented, namely the 
prosperous parts of the West. 
So if instead of asking why debates about gender and international law are so 
dominated by certain essentialized images of victimized femininity that draw 
heavily, if unwittingly, on missionary discourses,51 a point that has by now been 
well established, we ask what might have prompted or merely encouraged radical 
feminist theorizing to shift to the transnational in the first place, we might begin 
to see something that to my knowledge has not been identified in the voluminous 
literature on legal feminism: namely, the failure of the structuralist feminist 
paradigm of female subjectivity to catch on at home. 
Why did the MacKinnon perspective not prosper at the domestic level, 
 
48. MACKINNON, supra note 29. 
49. KOTISWARAN, supra note 23; Spivak, supra note 22, at 297. 
50. See, e.g., Halley et al., supra note 25, at 381–82. 
51. See, e.g., Sophie Day, The Re-Emergence of ‘Trafficking’: Sex Work Between Slavery and Freedom, 
16 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 816, 819–23 (2010) (drawing parallels between 
contemporary discourse about sex trafficking and the nineteenth- and twentieth-century “panic” over 
“white slavery”). 
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which was its initial scale? Any answer to this question is of course bound to be 
rather speculative. But one factor that must have played a role, at however 
unconscious a level, is the fact that MacKinnon was, after all, a product of middle-
class American law school culture—as was her primary audience—and American 
culture has long been dominated by ideas of individual agency. American law 
school culture, and indeed the mainstream white culture of which it forms an 
integral part, is largely made up of narratives of individual freedom and equality, in 
which equality is usually regarded as the product of struggles against 
discrimination led by courageous individuals. That the heroine of a feminist best 
seller of the 1970s, The Woman’s Room, is portrayed as struggling against adversity 
for a long time until the wonderful moment at which she gains admission to the 
Harvard Law School52 is by no means a coincidence. While feminists everywhere, 
not just in the United States, have often borrowed this type of feminist Horatio 
Alger narrative to inspire their troops, feminists in the United States may well have 
been particularly susceptible to the Oprah Winfrey paradigm suggesting if you 
work hard enough and believe in yourself, you can go to Harvard, and your sisters 
everywhere will benefit even if you only practice corporate law. Ms. magazine, the 
key liberal feminist house organ of the 1970s and 1980s, relied precisely on 
popularizing, for a female audience, this most American of all narratives of the self 
and its quest for freedom. And white middle-class women did indeed start to go to 
law school, including Harvard, in large numbers, and even to become corporate 
executives, albeit in smaller numbers. The feminization of the Horatio Alger 
narrative was not a merely discursive move. 
In retrospect, we can see that within white middle-class women’s circles, the 
perpetual optimism and individualism of the liberal Ms. was very likely to prevail 
over the relentlessly bleak, universal oppression narrative of the MacKinnon 
analysis. Hard-line structuralism, if one can venture a generalization, has never 
prospered and is unlikely to ever prosper on American soil.53 The political and 
philosophical content of MacKinnon’s view of gendered subjectivity has been 
repeatedly critiqued, but commentators have not pointed out that its practical 
fortunes were heavily influenced by the fact that her audience, largely brought up 
on vapid liberalism, was undoubtedly swayed by the radical and grand scope of her 
theorization of gender—but it was unlikely that they would for long identify with 
 
52. MARILYN FRENCH, THE WOMEN’S ROOM 233 (1977). 
53. I do not here mean to claim that all struggles for freedom or all indigenous American 
cultural narratives are necessarily liberal; indeed, I thank Chris Tomlins for educating me about the 
great diversity of freedom narratives found in U.S. legal cultures. See CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, 
FREEDOM BOUND: LAW, LABOR, AND CIVIC IDENTITY IN COLONIZING ENGLISH AMERICA, 1580–
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the United States, especially in its law schools (social science departments harbored socialists then and 
now), MacKinnon’s hardline determinism thus appeared as the only real alternative to vapid rights 
liberalism to many young legal feminists. But in the long run, applying the Althusserian paradigm to 
“domestic subjects” was bound to fail. 
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the wholly victimized and unindividualized subject of the theory (in both senses of 
“subject”). 
The MacKinnon/Dworkin narrative of universal and structural oppression 
was, by contrast, very much in tune with traditional Western depictions of the 
Third World, particularly of women in the Third World. American middle-class 
women who go to law school or imagine themselves as potentially going to law 
school are unlikely to think of themselves as always already victimized by the very 
fact that they are sexed as women. But that, for women in Africa and in Asia, sex 
and the gender relations that arise from sex are nothing but opportunities for 
oppression is a claim that resonates with both missionary and liberal-feminist 
narratives and that therefore has plausibility. Shifting attention away from 
domestic law, away from ordinary Americans and everyday gendered subjectivity, 
and focusing instead on exotic locations in which women can be easily imagined, 
by Western feminists, as essentially and inherently victimized merely by virtue of 
being women, was arguably the crucial scale shift that allowed radical feminism to 
revive itself in the twenty-first century by shifting to the transnational. By contrast, 
on the domestic front, the turn of the century brought no good news, only the 
hypermasculine patriotism and right-wing reaction occasioned by the events of 
September 11, 2001. 
The second scale shift that becomes visible if one compares today’s feminist 
legal thought to that of thirty years ago is not geographical at all, but rather 
theoretical, perhaps even ontological. It is the shift away from “the subject” and 
what we used to call its “consciousness,” including its gendered consciousness, 
and toward nonsubjective, indeed nonhuman scales: those of spaces, flows, and 
networks. Whether influenced by legal geography, by actor-network theory, or by 
sociological studies of “the networked society,” today’s theoretically inclined legal 
feminists tend to speak about spaces and about networks of governance rather 
than about “the subject” (or, for that matter, “the state,” which throughout the 
1980s was theorized alongside the political subject, and with the same tools). 
Looking through library databases for recent work in feminist legal theory in 
preparation for this Article, I came across a keynote address given at the 
University of Kent Centre for Law, Gender, and Sexuality, an important node in 
contemporary feminist legal analysis. Entitled Text and Terrain: Mapping Sexuality 
and Law,54 Bela Chatterjee’s talk struck me as being on the theoretical leading edge. 
It explores different ways of using spatialization as a theoretical tool in the analysis 
of sexuality and law.55 The abstract reads: 
Drawing on recent work in theoretical cartography, this article seeks to 
argue that a cartographical reading of law can be usefully brought to bear 
on the legal analysis of sexuality. . . . [of] how sexuality is mapped both 
 
54. Bela Chatterjee, Text and Terrain: Mapping Sexuality and the Law, 17 LAW & CRITIQUE 297 
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within and without the law through cultural texts, and how law’s 
encounters with the terrains mapped out by those texts might be enriched 
and diversified.56 
I hasten to add that I am not criticizing Chatterjee’s project; indeed, I, or 
some of my graduate students, might well have written the same abstract. I am 
merely using the text as an example of a kind of symptom of our current 
fascination with space and flows—and, occasionally, temporalization. The focus 
on space and time and flows does not necessarily imply a turning away from 
subjectivity, since for years now legal geographers have shown that subjectivity 
can be and often is constructed through spatial techniques; but in the case of 
Chatterjee’s article, and much work in the same vein, subjectivity is a secondary 
category, with particular forms of subjectivity appearing, in a somewhat black-
boxed manner, as the inevitable products of spatial or quasi-spatial flows and 
networks.57 
The apparently complete disappearance of psychoanalytic language from 
today’s feminist legal theory is another symptom of the same phenomenon. To 
resort to biographical data for a moment, around 1990, a feminist reading group I 
belonged to spent much time poring over Lacanian texts, in the belief that to do 
serious feminist theory we had to decide whether Lacan, rather than the more 
conventional psychoanalytic theory then current amongst feminists, offered 
promise. The reading group’s agenda thus presupposed that subjectivity was the 
question. Today, graduate students, feminist or not, are much more likely to have 
read Henri Lefebvre’s extremely obscure and dense work on the social production 
of space than to have glanced through any psychoanalytic works, Lacanian or 
otherwise. I regularly teach Foucault to both graduate and undergraduate students, 
and I have come to realize that to teach The History of Sexuality Volume 158 to 
today’s students, one first needs to explain that progressives in the 1970s thought 
that sexual “repression” was a key evil of capitalist society. Repression, which in 
the 1970s and 1980s was a widely used, not purely academic concept, appears now 
as an odd, libertarian theory of the hippie generation. Today’s students understand 
“biopower” quite readily, but the critique of the repression hypothesis requires a 
fair bit of intellectual history contextualization. 
In general, whether or not psychoanalysis is useful, and, if so, what kind of 
psychoanalysis were burning questions when the taken-for-granted object of 
theory was “the subject” and the subject’s consciousness or subjectivity. If one is 
interested in mapping global networks of capital flows or of migrant labor or of 
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women sex workers, by contrast, psychoanalysis seems irrelevant, since its various 
answers are not answers to today’s questions. 
The scale shift toward the transnational is hardly unique to today’s feminist 
thought and practice.59 Similarly, the turn away from “the subject” to the 
nonpsychological and often disembodied language of spaces, territories, networks, 
and flows is hardly a feminist invention. But even if the causes of the current 
generation’s scale shifts are not unique to any one movement or political 
perspective, the particular features of the broader shifts will naturally differ, 
depending on the issues and the interests involved. And if we focus on the 
transformation of feminist concerns, the quiet abandonment of domestic-scale 
analyses that the past few decades have witnessed has resulted in the equally quiet 
demise of two (related) critiques that gave concrete shape to the overall agenda of 
theorizing gendered subjectivity. One was the radical critique of liberal feminism’s 
long-standing interest in equalizing marriage, a critique that involved questioning 
the contractual model of human relations that underpins liberalisms of all sorts, 
from classic to neo-, including feminist liberalism. The second literature that 
disappeared from view as a result of the scale shift away from the domestic was 
the debate around domestic labor, its role in capitalism, its value, and its politics. 
II. WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE CRITIQUE OF MARRIAGE AND DOMESTICITY? 
The radical questioning of the contractual paradigm underlying the 
companionate marriage ideal was carried out most explicitly and thoroughly by 
Australian political theorist Carole Pateman.60 But, in a less explicit manner, it also 
permeated Catharine MacKinnon’s relentlessly pessimistic view of all sexual 
relationships,61 which like Pateman’s work attacked not only existing inequalities 
but also the ideal of the freely choosing liberal (female) subject that liberal 
feminism had long held as the remedy to the disease of sexism. 
Carole Pateman’s The Sexual Contract, one of the most heavily cited 
theoretical feminist works of the 1980s (MacKinnon aside), had an ambiguous 
character. At first sight, the book, which reads a lot like a dissertation in classical 
political theory, seems to aim to produce an internal critique of liberal theory by 
pointing out the systemic exclusion of women from the social contract. The way 
in which classic contract thinkers, especially John Locke and Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, repress and yet use the subordination of individual women to individual 
men in marriage as the unspoken premise of the social contract amongst male 
heads of household is critiqued at great length62 in analyses that are still heavily 
cited today by feminist political scientists. Pateman shows that the social contract 
 
59. See, e.g., NANCY FRASER, SCALES OF JUSTICE: REIMAGINING POLITICAL SPACE IN A 
GLOBALIZING WORLD (2009). 
60. See CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988). 
61. MacKinnon, supra note 42, at 245 (referring to sexuality as “the linchpin of gender 
inequality”). 
62. PATEMAN, supra note 60, at 1–14. 
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theorists’ rejection of patriarchalism and traditional paternal authority masks the 
fact that the new liberal contract is not an agreement amongst ungendered, equal 
sovereign beings, but rather a pact amongst brothers or quasi brothers, who defeat 
the patriarch and then agree to respect each other and each other’s sway over their 
private domestic realms, including the women in those realms.63 The 
subordination of women to men is both an effect and a key precondition of the 
social contract, Pateman shows; it is what sociolegal scholars would call 
constitutive (though she does not use that language).64 
Some, if not most, of Pateman’s critiques of the structural sexism of liberal 
contract theory could have been recuperated either for liberalism—by arguing that 
women too need to be included as foundational agents, as parties to the original 
social contract—or, alternatively, by the Hegelian-Marxist critique of contract as 
the model for political society. But Pateman chooses to use her critiques 
differently, more noticeably in the latter parts of the book, which engage directly 
with feminist legal and political analyses. The radical critique of the idea (or myth) 
of equality that grounds all forms of contractualism is not taken in either a 
Hegelian, Durkheimian, or a Marxist direction. (Indeed, Marxist critiques of liberal 
legality from Pashukanis onward are barely mentioned, despite the fact that they 
then constituted the main theoretical resource to critique contractualism). Instead, 
what one might call a pure feminist approach is taken, an approach that, drawing 
on some radical feminist ideas of the time, rejects not only liberal social contract 
theory, but also the whole liberal feminist project of attempting to gain for women 
the right to be equal with men, legally and socially. 
A brief discussion of this influential book in the light of subsequent 
intellectual developments in feminist theory illuminates one of the key differences 
between then and now—namely, the curious and unremarked disappearance, over 
the past decade or so, of second-wave feminism’s critique of that contractual or 
quasi-contractual mechanism that is marriage.65 
Rejecting the liberal feminist ideal of marriage as a contract among equals, 
Pateman, while not explicitly endorsing the then-popular French feminist 
philosophy of sexual difference, argues that even if marriage were to be equal, the 
only kind of equality that contract can provide is one that presupposes and 
reproduces the masculinist isolated individual of classic liberal thought—the 
individual that does not need others, is not significantly affected by age and 
 
63. Id. at 2–3, 77–78. 
64. Id. at 2–3. 
65. Marriage seems to only come under critical scrutiny in some queer-theory-driven 
discussions about the negative, conservatizing political effects of the gay movement’s focus on same-
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within the gay rights movement, not to legal theorists in general or to feminists in general. Noted 
family law scholar Martha Fineman comments that neither feminist nor mainstream family law today 
is centrally concerned with marriage, even though marriage was the core of family law for many 
decades. Martha Albertson Fineman, Grappling with Equality: One Feminist Journey, in TRANSCENDING 
THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW, supra note 3, at 47, 47–61. 
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biology, is not constituted in relationships, and does not have a serious 
commitment to children.66 “Woman can attain the formal standing of civil 
individuals but as embodied feminine beings we can never be ‘individuals’ in the 
same sense as men.”67 
Other chapters devoted to particular issues are all variations on the theme of 
the evil effects of contractualism. One chapter attacks prostitution on the basis 
that the very existence of prostitution demeans women and shows the evil effects 
of commodifying one’s body.68 It also attacks the then quite new practice of 
surrogacy, using the same arguments about the commodification of women’s 
bodies.69 And the most significant chapter, in retrospect, attacks the institution of 
marriage.70 Even the most equal of marriage contracts, Pateman writes, has the 
effect of turning female sexuality and female reproduction into quasi commodities; 
if relations between the sexes are thought of as contractual, there is virtually no 
difference between marriage and “universal prostitution.”71 Some feminists, 
Pateman adds, attempt to achieve liberal equality by focusing on workplace 
equality and eliminating patriarchal vestiges within marriage, but all that this kind 
of feminism can achieve is a situation in which (some) women are expected to act 
and think like men and equality is contingent on achieving masculine personal 
goals.72 
Rereading Pateman’s influential work sheds light on the fortunes of feminist 
legal theory at a number of levels. Most striking, in retrospect, is her eloquent but 
clearly dated appeal to female bodily experience as a concrete and immoveable fact 
that no amount of legal abstractions about “the person” can abolish—an appeal 
that one rarely hears today, if ever, in either legal or political theory contexts, since 
anything striking of gender essentialism fell by the wayside from the late 1980s 
onward, attacked on all sides by queer theory, postcolonial feminism, science 
studies feminism and antiracist feminism. But is Pateman’s denunciation of the 
feminist pursuit of the ideal of an equal marriage contract equally outdated? Is it 
perhaps ironic that feminists today are more likely to be supporting the extension 
of the legally and culturally privileged institution of marriage to gays and lesbians 
than to be rereading the old critiques of marriage as inherently oppressive? Has 
the fairly successful international campaign to legalize same-sex marriage managed 
 
66. PATEMAN, supra note 60, at 5–6. 
67. Id. at 224. Pateman emphasizes bodily difference more than most North American 
feminists, but a similar, albeit more sociological, critique of the masculine assumptions undergirding 
the sovereign individual of liberal political theory was simultaneously being carried out by many 
feminist legal theorists. Martha Minow, for example, promoted a “relational” view of subjectivity, but 
she distanced herself from gender essentialism and biological determinism. MARTHA MINOW, 
MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 230–31 (1990). 
68. PATEMAN, supra note 60, at 189–218. 
69. Id. at 209–18. 
70. Id. at 154–88. 
71. Id. at 184. 
72. Id. at 153–55. 
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to achieve what the John Stuart Mill ideal of the equal, companionate heterosexual 
marriage of two fully autonomous liberal subjects did not manage to do—namely, 
inoculate the institution of marriage against radical critique by feminist legal 
thinkers? 
A very important point here is that radical feminists who did not flirt with 
the French feminism of difference, and who were skeptical of all appeals to 
nature, physiological reproduction, and biological pregnancy and birth, 
nevertheless shared Pateman’s goal of de-exceptionalizing both prostitution and 
other overtly commercial practices, such as contract pregnancy, by repeating the 
old Emma Goldman argument that marriage is not qualitatively different from 
prostitution, at least as long as women do not have access to adequate incomes of 
their own. MacKinnon, for example, states as a matter of course that “feminism 
stresses the indistinguishability of prostitution, marriage, and sexual harassment.”73 
MacKinnon never developed the critique of marriage at any length, perhaps 
because she did not want to alienate either the mainstream liberal feminists or the 
conservative antipornography and antiprostitution organizations on which she has 
always relied to push her campaigns forward politically; but in her early work, 
marriage was routinely described as inherently patriarchal, in keeping with 
standard feminist wisdom of the era. The effect of including marriage amongst 
other examples of legalized gender oppression was to focus feminist critiques on 
the everyday lives of ordinary Americans engaged in “normal” activities, radically 
“estranging” them by denouncing the hidden structures of oppression present in 
every happy suburban home. This is a far cry from today’s fascination with Asian 
and African sites of extreme gender oppression, a fascination that cannot but 
produce self-satisfaction about middle-class Western women’s own position. 
Along with the institution of marriage, which today almost never appears as 
the explicit focus of feminist legal critique (with the partial exception of queer 
theory’s critiques of gay and lesbian domesticity, though these do not circulate 
widely),74 domestic labor too (in the sense of unpaid labor in the household) 
received much critical attention and gave rise to innovative theoretical work, 
mostly by socialist feminists critiquing the omission of this type of work from the 
Marxist paradigm of labor power and surplus value.75 It should not be surprising 
 
73. MACKINNON, supra note 18, at 59. 
74. Many gay-movement critiques of the choice to pursue same-sex marriage over other 
political goals arise from a somewhat masculinized libertarianism, but there are also critiques that are 
specifically feminist. One interesting example is Katherine Franke’s critical commentary on the gay-
lesbian movement’s use of the Loving v. Virginia precedent. Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 
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compared with other forms of human attachment, commitment, and desire”). 
75. See, e.g., MEG LUXTON, MORE THAN A LABOUR OF LOVE: THREE GENERATIONS OF 
WOMEN’S WORK IN THE HOME (1980); MARIA MIES, PATRIARCHY AND ACCUMULATION ON A 
WORLD SCALE: WOMEN IN THE INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOUR (1986). 
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that the disappearance of marriage as an object of feminist legal critique should be 
accompanied by the invisibilization of the unpaid work of housewives. 
Within North America, Meg Luxton’s pioneering book More than a Labour of 
Love constituted one important effort to effect an internal critique of the Marxist 
theory of labor and labor power.76 In a manner that had some similarities with 
Pateman’s critique of the constitutive role of women’s exclusion from social 
contract, though informed by empirical studies of working-class families rather 
than by the history of political thought, Luxton showed that the unpaid, 
uncommodified work performed in the household, largely by women, is 
fundamental for the success of capitalism.77 Marx had, of course, recognized that 
capitalism downloads the cost of reproducing labor power to working-class 
households, both at the scale of each working day and at the scale of the 
generational reproduction of the labor force. But he had not considered the 
gendering of domestic labor theoretically significant, and neither he nor his 
followers had paid serious attention to the way in which the working-class male 
head of household benefits as much as the capitalist from the patriarchal 
arrangements. Luxton’s analysis, arising out of a socialist feminism that considered 
masculine privilege as politically and economically on par with class privilege, 
paved the way for feminist critiques of the internal dynamics of working-class 
households. 
In Europe, and to a lesser extent in other parts of the world, the “domestic 
labor debate” usually featured the group Wages for Housework, which remained 
small, but was politically visible in numerous metropolitan cities with active 
feminist movements in the 1980s—until, in keeping with the scale shift analyzed 
in this Article, it quietly disappeared from the scene as the 1990s wore on. At a 
more theoretical level, Maria Mies developed an influential analysis that connected 
women’s unpaid work in the home with imperialist economic relations,78 creating 
a new approach to theorizing female subjectivity that, unusually for the time, 
worked at the global scale, but retained a more or less Marxist, political economy 
framework while focusing on everyday gender relations. Mies’s work has been 
aptly characterized by Kotiswaran—one of the very few feminist theorists of the 
current millennial generation to cite her work—as “dependency feminism.”79 
Mies’s now-neglected work is important here because it demonstrates that 
some feminist theorists of the 1980s (those working in socialist and anti-
imperialist frameworks) considered the scale now called transnational or global to 
be crucial to their analyses of gendered subjectivity and patriarchal power. Liberal 
and radical feminists were largely uninterested in the field of practice and theory 
that was then called “anti-imperialism,”80 and therefore their gaze remained 
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trained almost exclusively on issues of concern to women in the metropole. But 
socialist feminists of the 1980s did not confine their analyses or their political 
activities to the sphere of the national, a fact that underlines the contingency of 
the “turn to the transnational” visible in the late 1990s and the early twenty-first 
century. In fact, socialist feminists had a long-standing interest in what Marxists 
called “internationalism,” and so they were better placed to make the transition to 
the transnational than radical feminists; but socialist feminists would have refused 
to collaborate with and support the kinds of coercive interventions in the 
“Orient” that radical feminists have supported under the banner of protecting 
women.81 In other words, since socialist feminists had no allies, either amongst 
mainstream liberal feminists or amongst governments that, for their own 
imperialist reasons, have been interested in promoting anti-trafficking and other 
campaigns in the international arena, they had no way to reinvent their enterprise 
in the twenty-first century, unlike radical and liberal feminist legal activists and 
thinkers who, foiled at home, found a fertile field of activity in the transnational. 
There was no theoretical reason why the critique of the constitutive role of 
women’s unpaid domestic work carried out by Mies and others should have been 
the victim of the decline of Marxism, since liberal economics too fails to value 
women’s unpaid work in the home. But somehow, as the scale of analysis shifted 
for feminists interested in questions of political economy away from domestic (in 
the sense of national) welfare-state policies to the scale of transnational or global 
neoliberalism, domestic uncommodified labor seems to have also fallen by the 
wayside as a topic of interest. If the domestic scale, in the sense of state-level 
policy, receives far less attention today than it did at the high point of social 
democratic national politics, the domestic in the other sense has become 
downright invisible. Indeed, Fraser’s Scales of Justice, one of many works that notes 
the shift from national to transnational legal arenas as a key element of the 
transformation of feminism in recent decades, focuses so exclusively on the 
dialectic of national and transnational or international governance that Fraser 
completely neglects both marriage and domesticity—as if the scale of the ordinary 
family were no longer important for feminist theory.82 The absence of the 
domestic scale from Fraser’s recent work is particularly notable because Fraser’s 
own earlier, highly influential work provided important theoretical tools (based in 
part on Habermas and in part on Marxist feminism) that could have been used to 
continue analyzing the complex relations linking the family/household, civil 
society, and the state.83 
 
the phrase “anti-imperialist,” a term which did a great deal of work in the 1970s and 1980s, within 
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CONCLUSION 
Reflecting on the disappearance, since the 1980s, of two key topics of 
feminist legal critique (the marriage contract and the implied domestic labor 
contract) that, taken together, performed not only a systematic critique of the 
liberal legal subject that underpins mainstream feminism, but also a radical critique 
of the social relations of ordinary domesticity in the metropole, helps us to see 
that the scale shift that characterizes contemporary feminist legal and political 
analysis does not consist only of a geographical turn toward the global and/or a 
jurisdictional turn toward international law. The widely noticed shift from nation-
state frames to transnational/global frames is connected to a less visible or less 
discussed shift in what one might call ontological (rather than geographical) scale. 
While the gendered subjectivity of individual, everyday, Western married women 
was the main theoretical object for Western feminist thinkers in the 1970s and 
1980s, giving rise not only to battles about abortion rights and equal pay, but also 
to a vast array of popular feminist Bildungsroman-style novels, films, and 
magazine articles, the current paradigm maintains an almost obsessive focus on 
the collective condition of exotic non-Western women, imagined as always already 
victimized by inhuman labor conditions and (most importantly, for radical 
feminists) a systematic sexual exploitation generally described in exoticist and 
Orientalist terms. What we could call the “Orientalization” of female oppression is 
linked not only to a geographic scale shift away from the metropole, and more 
generally away from the scale of the nation-state, but also to the rise of an 
Orientalist ontology within which subjectivity is not even a question, an ontology 
that undergirds the work of both liberal and radical feminist lawyers and writers 
on international issues. 
While the Orientalization of women’s oppression is probably the key 
element in American feminist lawyers’ international endeavors, theoretically 
inclined feminists working within postcolonial and other antiracist paradigms 
work at the transnational level without perpetuating this exoticization of the object 
and the subject of feminism, and indeed make the critique of Orientalism central 
to their analyses of gender. But they too seem to have put subjectivity on the back 
burner, for quite different reasons. Perhaps as a response to the exhaustion that 
set in as the battles about postmodernism degenerated into fruitless trench 
warfare, feminist thinkers who eschew both liberal and radical-feminist 
frameworks and work within left-wing and anti-Orientalist paradigms often avoid 
discussing either subjectivity or women, focusing instead on “text and terrain”84 or 
on spatializations and temporalizations that are not gender-specific. Noted 
feminist legal thinker Martha Fineman, for instance, now prefers to talk about 
vulnerability as the basis of entitlement for purposes of state benefits, a 
construction that deliberately shifts the focus away from both women and other 
specific identities and toward relations that are changeable and not identity-
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based.85 On her part, Judith Butler writes as much about U.S. militarism and 
Israeli nationalism as about gender.86 My own work too has only rarely featured 
the word “gender” in either titles or subtitles since about 1993; and, in keeping 
with actor-network theory and other new approaches, I now tend to focus more 
on spaces and flows and networks than on people and/or self-consciousness.87 
The turn away from people and their subjectivity no doubt has good 
theoretical reasons supporting it; but a certain political price has been paid for this 
choice, whether we realize it or not. The disappearance from critical legal studies, 
including most feminist legal studies, of the kinds of critiques of marriage and 
domestic labor produced in the 1980s may be a case of collateral damage. Despite 
the celebrations of happy gay and lesbian marriages, some of us remain critical of 
the institution of marriage for all the “old” feminist reasons; but whether the 
choice to put the critique of marriage and domesticity in the closet was intentional 
or not, conservatizing or not, this choice may hold great significance for the future 
fate of feminism in metropolitan countries. What that fate will turn out to be, 
nobody can predict. But the dual scale shift documented in this Article needs to be 
understood and discussed by those who still care about feminism’s aspirations. 
I hasten to add that I am not engaging in nostalgia here by lamenting the 
fragmentation of feminist legal theory over the past couple of decades. On the 
contrary, I am actually quite pleased that it has finally become very clear that the 
grandiose project to elaborate a general theory of gender and law has proved to be 
impossible, as Nicola Lacey pointed out some time ago,88 and as I think is widely 
accepted now. While MacKinnon still holds on to gender as not only the main, 
but even the only category of analysis (e.g., her ludicrous argument that the attacks 
on the United States of September 11, 2001, should be understood as caused by 
hypermasculinity89), other feminist theorists have to a large extent, moved on to 
critical reflections on law and state power in which gender is regarded as 
inseparable from other processes, such as racialization, religion, nationalism, and 
colonialism. That is no doubt a positive development insofar as it eschews 
ghettoizing gender as an analytical category and ghettoizing feminists within the 
world of theory. But something was lost as the analyses of the everyday 
subjectivity of ordinary women that gave us the critique not only of marriage but 
also of contractualism90 and the critique of unpaid housewifely labor disappeared 
from view. Just what has been lost in the dual scale shift mapped in this Article 
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needs to be the subject of collective reflection if we are to move forward in a 
reflexive and self-aware manner. 
 
